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Abstract 
The following thesis outlines the current social and political situation surrounding 
organized crime violence in Mexico. Using Samuel P. Huntington’s Political Order in 
Changing Societies and regression analysis, the purpose is to highlight the lack of 
subnational data within Mexico. Political science and economic theories guide the reader 
to better understanding what types of policy change or reform may need to occur in 
Mexico’s future years. 
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I. Introduction 
Discovering potential causations for violence is a worthwhile endeavor for any person 
attempting to develop political strategy or policy.  Policy presents a puzzle for those 
holding positions of power that yearn to decrease violence in their particular 
constituency. There are many key factors when determining what course of action is best 
to decrease violence.  However, this thesis described the major “pillars” of policy as 
education, health, wealth, politics, technology, and the media.    Undoubtedly, different 
theories exist to explain violence.  Conditions like industrialization, modernization, 
frustration, mobilization, corruption, aspiration, and consumption connect the pillars. In 
keeping with the puzzle metaphor, the pillars act as the pieces, and the conditions help fit 
together the pieces.  While there may not always be a perfect fit, policy is born from the 
process of experimentation and historical context.  There are pitfalls and shortcomings of 
policy, and most times, a regression analysis does not epitomize the entire issue.  
Nonetheless, researchers must continue to hypothesize and theorize why and how policy 
works.   
Mexico is a fascinating case study due to its high levels of organized crime 
violence and simultaneous political stability. The current judicial, law enforcement, and 
educational reform, specifically on the local level, is needed and required for Mexico to 
decrease the current epidemic of violence perpetrated by organized crime groups.  The 
process is currently under way with President Enrique Peña Nieto arranging the pieces of 
the puzzle.  The following set forth theoretical as well as economic models for explaining 
possible root causes of violence.  Unfortunately, policy reform will take more time, 
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research, and money.  Without more personal surveys, a lack of transparency and proper 
data collection in Mexico makes academic research frustrating at times. The Trans-
Border Institute and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) are two 
academic research centers that are invaluable sources of information, especially when 
studying outside of Mexico.  The ensuing thesis investigated the case of Mexican 
organized crime violence at the sub-national level.  
2013: Mexico and Violence 
Currently, the ubiquitous hook pertaining to Mexican crime rates has been to cite the over 
60,000 organized crime related homicides throughout the Calderón administration (BBC, 
2012b) (Trans-Border Institute [TBI], 2013).1 However, while Mexican violence, 
specifically organized crime violence, has risen substantially over recent years, the 
simple fact remains, “violence is lower in Mexico than elsewhere in Latin America” 
(TBI, 2013, p. 1).  A more comprehensive statistic is the homicide rate typically reported 
in per 100,000 of the population. The Economist (2012) produced an intriguing 
inforgraphic, which compares the homicide rate of individual Mexican states (entidades 
federativas) with different countries.  Figure 1 is a duplication of this infographic 
published on The Economist’s website on November 22, 2012. 
Violence is not new to Mexico.  Camp (2011) argued that “the political 
development and institutional relationships following the [1910] revolution [were] the 
                                                 
1
 The Trans-Border Institute (TBI) and their annual report Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis, 
provides the most comprehensive report on drug violence in Mexico.  For a more detailed explanation of 
what constitutes a homicide linked to drug trafficking and organized crime, please see page 11 of the 2013 
report. Also, due to different reporting techniques by the media versus the government, there is still debate 
on the exact number of homicides attributable to organized crime (Beittel, 2013). 
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foundations for the political relationships that characterized Mexico for the next century”.  
Thus, the evolution of modern Mexican political, military, and civilian institutional  
 
Figure 1: Mexican Murder Rate Equivalents 
 
Source: The Economist (2012) 
structure as well as ideology were born from the extremely violent Mexican Revolution 
of 1910 (Camp, 2011).  According to O’Neil et al. (2010), “About 1.5 million Mexicans 
(about 7 percent of the total population) died in the conflict” (p. 413).  Presently, the 
violence has included “assassinations of politicians and judges, attacks on rival 
organizations, attacks on the police and other security forces, attacks on associated 
civilians (i.e., the families of members of competing groups or of government officials), 
and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders” (Paul et al., 2011).  
Additionally, mass gravesites have been discovered since 2010 through 2012. (TBI, 
2013, p. 19).   Table 1 shows the range of the number of victims discovered at these mass 
gravesites or narcofosas.  
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Despite upward trends of violence in the 21st century, in 2012, Mexican violence 
seemed to either remain constant or decline imperceptibly (TBI, 2013, p. 1).  Moreover, 
TBI found “total drug arrests soared further to a peak of 36,332 in 2012” which included 
Table 1: Mass Gravesites (Narcofosas), 2010-2012 
 
Source: Trans-Border Institute (2013) 
many high ranking organized crime leaders  (TBI, 2013, p. 2).  Recently, an analyst of 
the Congressional Research Center predicted a grim future for Mexico. 
It is widely believed that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides during 
the six-year administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) is likely to 
trend down far more slowly than it rose (Beittel, 2013). 
 
The question remains as to why organized crime violence in Mexico rose so dramatically 
since 2007.   
Government, the Executive Branch, and Reform 
Incrementally since the Revolution of 1910, Mexico has constantly been able to maintain 
civilian authority over the military, and as afore mentioned, violence has been an element 
of modern Mexico (Camp, 2011). From 1929 through 2000, the Institutional 
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Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated Mexican politics (Camp, 2011).  However, 
alongside the party, the executive branch has been the most dominant branch in politics 
(O’Neil et al., 2010).   
Mexican presidents enjoyed near-dictatorial powers with few checks on their authority.  
Through the domination of the PRI, they not only controlled the judiciary but also 
handpicked the state governors.  The Mexican legislature might have served as a check 
on the PRI, but until July 1997 it was controlled by it. (O’Neil et al., 2010, p. 417) 
 
In the 21st century, the vast power and unchallenged authority of Mexican presidents have 
waned. 
Since Fox’s historic victory in 2000, Mexico’s presidents have lacked a majority in 
Congress.  As a result, some of the constitutional checks on presidential power that were 
long absent in the Mexican system have become more effective. (O’Neil et al., 2010, p. 
418) 
 
Nonetheless, Mexico’s president still appoints and oversees a large cabinet of ministers 
that control various government secretariats (O’Neil et al., 2010).  The Secretariat of the 
Interior, which presides over internal affairs, and the Secretariat of Economy have been 
regarded as the most prominent posts (O’Neil et al., 2010), and as important policy 
makers, they play substantial roles in the war on organized crime groups (OCGs).  In 
regards to law enforcement, Sabet (2010) pointedly remarks that,  
Executive power and police dependence on the executive appears to be one of the biggest 
obstacles to reform. In theory, executive appointment of police chiefs should make the 
police more accountable to citizens and executive discretion should facilitate rapid 
reform, but in practice, this power has led to window dressing reform, patronage 
appointments, poor policies, and a lack of continuity in reform efforts.  Ironically, while 
executive control makes rapid change possible, it makes real reform difficult to 
institutionalize” (p. 266).   
 
Still, in order to understand the violence over time, comparing the differences in 
policy between Mexican presidential administrations is vital.  In July 2012, after an 
official recount due to claims of fraud, Enrique Peña Nieto was elected the 57th President 
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of Mexico (BBC, 2012a).  President Nieto faces new as well as existing challenges, and 
like his predecessor Felipe Calderón, President Nieto will determine many of the policies 
regarding Mexican civil-military relations and the strategy to defeat Mexican OCGs.  The 
geographic battlegrounds of violence appear to be most concentrated in the central and 
eastern border region, as well as in central Pacific coast states on the mainland (TBI, 
2013).  In any case, TBI (2013) stated “the worst violence has remained concentrated in 
fewer than 10 percent of Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities” (p. 1).2  While the number of 
arrests and stagnant homicide rate appears to be good news, the military tactics employed 
by President Calderón has simultaneously fragmented these networks bringing “greater 
over all violence and a more diffuse distribution of violence to different areas throughout 
the country” (TBI, 2013, p. 2). During Calderón’s administration, two drug trafficking 
organizations became dominant. 
These two are now polarized rivals—the Sinaloa DTO in the western part of the country 
and Los Zetas in the east. They remain the largest drug trafficking organizations in 
Mexico and both have moved aggressively into Central America (Beittel, 2013). 
 
 Undoubtedly, in order to properly develop policy, President Nieto must examine the 
power struggles between the cartels and geographical distribution of related violence 
(Beittel, 2013) (Walker, 2013).  
The weaknesses of civilian institutions, specifically corruption and bribery of the 
police and government officials3, contributed to why the relatively strong military 
institutions were brought to the forefront of what has commonly been known as the “war 
                                                 
2
 Included in the Appendix are multiple charts and graphs reproduced from the report detailing Mexican 
homicides over time.    
3
 For a detailed approach to disaggregating corruption in Latin America with a focus on Mexico, see Morris 
(2008). He offers valuable insight the difference in measuring the perception versues participation in 
corruption.  
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on drugs” (The Economist [Economist], 2010) (Farah, 2010) (Sabet, 2010) (Shirk, 2010).  
However, this phrase, “war on drugs”, is a misnomer.  This “war” reaches far past the 
production, transportation, and sales of illicit drugs (Farah, 2012).  This “war” extends to 
the basic infrastructures of local and national Mexican civil institutions. Scholars, and the 
public alike, will observe how President Nieto decides to form his strategy and policy.  
The Mérida Initiative will continue between the United States and Mexico (Beittel, 
2013), but there are early indicators that President Nieto will not rely as heavily on the 
military as Calderon (Justice in Mexico Project, 2013). 
Mr. Peña Nieto pledged to place greater emphasis on crime prevention and violence 
reduction, making it clear that he no longer wishes to prioritize bringing down drug cartel 
leaders as his predecessor did. Mr. Peña Nieto also reconfigured Mexico’s security 
agencies, dismantling the Public Security Ministry (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, 
SSP) and announcing the creation of a 10,000-person National Gendarmerie and a unified 
police command system at the state level (TBI, 2013, p. 2). 
 
Strategic Forecasting Inc. (Stratfor), an intelligence agency, (2013) did not have 
optimistic projections in its Annual Forecast 2013.  It made this statement in regards to 
combatting the splintered cartels,  
There are no signs yet that some sort of truce among these groups will be possible in the 
coming year, and violence can be expected to continue much as it has in the past several 
years -- on a shifting geographical basis as each group competes for supply chain and 
market access at the expense of the others. Any government attempts to mediate a truce 
will be held in the strictest confidence to avoid a public backlash (Stratfor, 2013). 
 
This leaves room for debate on whether President Nieto will enter some sort of tacit 
agreement with organized crime groups (OCGs) so that violence and homicide rates will 
decrease (Sanchez, 2012).  This would not be the first time that this type of allegation has 
been made against the Mexican government.  During the 1980s, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) had similar accusations of a tacit agreement with cartels to 
decrease violence (Kilmer et al., 2010, p.37).   
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2013 poses many difficulties, and reforms must be made across many 
governmental institutions.  Recently, Mr. Peña Nieto jailed Esther Gordillo, the leader of 
Mexico’s powerful teachers’ union (The Economist, 2013). She had been widely 
recognized as corrupt with allegations of embezzling 2 billion pesos or 159 million 
dollars (The Economist, 2013).  At a minimum, Mexico’s police, judicial, and education 
institutions need immediate and effective reformations (Ingram et al., 2011) (Justice in 
Mexico Project, 2012) (Moloeznik et al., 2011) (Sabet, 2010) (Shirk 2010) (Santibañez et 
al., 2005) (The Economist, 2013). Furthermore, LAPOP’s Cultura política de la 
democracia en México (2011) found that 76.3 percent of Mexicans perceive their 
government in some way corrupt (p.88).4 Daniel Sabet provided a poignant overview of 
corruption within Mexico from the perspective of the police. 
It is a mistake to analyze the police as an isolated actor. Rather, the police force is 
embedded within a larger political, legal and cultural system. Politically, it is important to 
remember that the police leadership is appointed by, highly dependent on, and 
accountable to the elected president, governor, or mayor. While no president and only 
one governor has ever been convicted on collusion charges, there are no shortage of 
allegations of political collusion with organized crime and there appears to be widespread 
tolerance. Collusion and even tolerance effectively rules out the possibility of meaningful 
reform. Legally, there is considerable ambiguity in the justice system, discretion in the 
application of the law, and a tendency to elevate informal rules above the law. Culturally, 
citizens expect and sometimes even benefit from the ability to bribe officers. As officers 
frequently point out in rationalizing their own corruption, it is typically the citizen who 
will offer the bribe first (Sabet, 2010, p. 266). 
 
Terms, Concepts, and Geography 
The language describing Mexican crime syndicates is changing, and attributing these 
homicides merely to illicit drug activities is inaccurate.  From drug trafficking 
                                                 
4
 The Cultura política de la democracia en México is one of the most comprehensive national survey data 
collected by a private organization in Mexico.  It is a biennial report, and the 2010 report is referenced by 
Parás et al. (2011) in the Bibliography. 
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organizations (DTOs) to transnational organized crime (TOC) to organized crime groups 
(OCGs), scholars use different terms to describe Mexican cartels, which almost resemble 
a political institution more than illegal gangs. While drug production and trafficking 
account for a large proportion of Mexican cartel activity, these groups have clearly 
diversified into human trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping, 
extortion, bribery, racketeering, and oil theft (Kilmer et al., 2010, p. 37).  A recent 
monograph published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 
detailed the threats of criminal-terrorist hybrid groups as well as the potential threat of 
trafficking weapons of mass destruction through these hybrid organizations (Farah, 2012, 
p. 1). Instead of the traditional definition of Mexican cartels as drug trafficking 
organizations, transnational organized crime (TOC) seems like more appropriate 
terminology due to their obvious connections with organizations in the United States, 
Russia, and Asia (Farah, 2012). Undeniably, the afore-mentioned threats posed by TOC 
in general extend into Mexico (Farah, 2012), but not all Mexican organized crime groups 
are transnational, and “[b]ecause of the limitations and inaccuracies of the terms DTO 
and [TOC], some observers give preference to the more generic term “organized crime 
group” [OCG] that is used extensively in this [thesis]” (TBI, 2012, p. 4). 
As mentioned, Mexican violence has been concentrated in specific locations.  
Figure 2 shows the areas of influence of the OCGs, and the corresponding Venn 
diagrams show the contention between the OCGs.5  The violence stems from control of  
 
                                                 
5
 Again, please be referred to the Appendix for more in depth maps and figures. 
10 
 
Figure 2: Mexican Organized Crime Groups’ Areas of Influence 
 
Source: RAND (Paul et al., 2011) 
territory and corresponding trafficking routes (TBI, 2013).  Sinaloa, Durango, and 
Chihuahua account for nearly 60 percent of the drug related violence in Mexico (Camp, 
2011).  Figure 3 displays the geographical distribution of the violence over time.  As one 
can depict from the presented figures, the boundaries of the OCGs’ area of influence as 
well as the US-Mexico border correlate very strongly with the amount of violence, 
measured in homicides. Obviously, protecting and enforcing the rule of law in these  
highlighted areas, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Guerrero, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and 
Colima, are imperative to stability within Mexico. Interestingly, even though the OCGs 
operate on both sides of the border, the violence has not spilt over into the US (Kilmer et 
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Figure 3: Municipal Level maps of Deaths By Homicide, 2006 through 2011 
 
Source: TBI (2013) 
al., 2010). “El Paso is the second-safest city in the United States, with just 2.8 homicides 
per 100,000 (Borunda, 2009)—a rate that is lower than that of Paris or Geneva” (Kilmer 
et al., 2010, p. 1).   
While independent smugglers exist, as Figure 2 shows, seven major OCGs 
dominate the industry, but some of these organizations have splintered due to the 
aggressive policies of Calderón (TBI, 2013).  Most notably, the Gulf Cartel has 
essentially disintegrated into smaller groups.   Cartels are evolving: 
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initially there was one, very large cartel that is kind of the grandfather of most in the 
modern cartel groups that we know, and that was called the Guadalajara Cartel -- that 
became powerful really in the 60s and 70s in Mexico. That cartel ran into an issue in the 
mid-1980s when the cartel kidnapped and tortured and murdered a U.S. DEA agent by 
the name of Enrique Camarena (Stewart, 2013). 
 
This spurred US involvement, and the Guadalajara Cartel was dismantled.   
The post-Guadalajara cartel climate in Mexico has been one of vicious competition 
between competing cartels -- competition that has become increasingly militarized as 
cartel groups recruited first former police officers and then former special operations 
soldiers into their enforcer units. Today's Mexican cartels commonly engage in armed 
confrontations with rival cartels and the government using military ordnance, such as 
automatic weapons, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (Stewart, 2012).  
 
A RAND publication does an excellent job characterizing the OCGs (or DTOs), 
These organizations appear to be hierarchical, with well-identified bosses and senior 
leadership, and durable, in the sense that some of them, such as the Sinaloa and Gulf 
cartels, have survived the removal of the head of the organization. The configuration of 
organizations is not stable; new DTOs emerge from established ones… Many of the 
leaders come from the state of Sinaloa, on the northern Pacific coast of the country. There 
is no suggestion that any of the major DTOs specializes in a particular drug (Kilmer et 
al., 2010, p.36). 
 
As will be discussed in further detail, the geographic boundaries and the level of 
government authority determine the levels of violence within Mexico. 
Political Order in Changing Societies and 21st Century Mexico 
As a guide for this thesis, Samuel P. Huntington’s (1968) Political Order in Changing 
Societies was utilized to explain possible reasons for the organized crime violence.   He 
began his book by explaining the “political gap” that exists in modernizing nations.  He 
described politics through the following qualities: “consensus, community, legitimacy, 
organization, effectiveness, [and] stability” (Huntington, 1968, p.1).   Huntington argued 
that countries deficient in these qualities are less effective in governing. These 
modernizing countries can suffer from “shortages of food literacy, education, wealth, 
income, health, and productivity” (p.2), but more importantly, he argued that they suffer 
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from “a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate 
government” (p. 2).  Additionally, there exists a “gap” in modernizing countries between 
what can be rapid economic improvement and undifferentiated corrupt, ineffective, or 
weak political institutions.  The political evolution needed in these gap nations can have 
devastating consequences as Huntington explicated: 
With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War 
II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob 
violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders 
who often pursued disastrous economic and social
 
policies, widespread and blatant 
corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights 
and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, 
the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and 
courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based 
political parties (p. 3). 
  
 His main thesis stemmed from the fact that a political gap existing in developing 
countries cannot always be diminished through economic strengthening, or in his own 
words: 
What was responsible for this violence and instability? The primary thesis of this book is 
that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of 
new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions. 
"Among the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville observed, "there is one 
which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or 
to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in 
which the equality of conditions is increased." (Huntington, 1968, p.4) (Tocqueville, 
1955, p. 2 & 118) 
 
Huntington spoke of the importance of “civic morale and public spirit and political 
institutions” (p.4), and creating policy to strengthen these lofty and obtuse concepts is 
tedious and demanding.  A subtitle in his book was “Social Forces and Political 
Institutions” (p. 8).  These social forces and political institutions are comprised of what 
can seem like an endless number of variables.  However, Huntington stated,  
A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group. Modernization 
involves, in large part, the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in 
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society.  Kinship, racial, and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class, 
and skill groupings.  A political organization or procedure, on the other hand, is an 
arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and 
thus promoting community among two or more social forces (p. 8-9).   
 
“Power and influence” becomes incredibly important, but as Rousseau put, quoted by 
Huntington and many others, “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the 
master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty” (Rousseau & 
Bosanquet, 1895).   
Today, Mexico has difficulty accomplishing all of the requirements of a political 
organization proposed by Huntington (Parás et al., 2010). In 2010, 43.5 percent of 
Mexicans perceived that they were insecure or unsafe, and 26 percent, a 10 percent 
increase from 2008, had been victimized by a crime (Parás et al., 2010). Thus, the 
monopoly of violence simply is not secured by the state.  Furthermore, as this thesis 
argued, Mexican cartels are fulfilling duties that should be provided by political 
institutions (Stratfor, 2008).  So, rational political theory provides evidence that OCGs 
can be regarded as a political institution in Mexico. 
For almost the entirety of the 20th century, Mexico was a single party system 
(O’Neil et al., 2010).   
Single-party rule is very good for organized criminal groups. Organized crime relies on 
monopolies very strongly as a business model, and political monopolies play an 
important role in their strategies. Organized criminals remove competitors from a given 
market -- either by physical force, corruption or coercion -- and then rake in the money 
once they have started supplying the goods that nobody else can. Single-party rule means 
that as long as the criminal group has the loyalty of that party (bought either with money, 
force or both), then that group enjoys political protection as it conducts its business. PRI 
still wields influence as a minority partner in Calderon's government, and still controls 
many states, but it has fallen far from the dominant position in Mexican politics that it 
enjoyed during most of the 20th century. The political transitions going on in Mexico on 
both the national and local levels are affecting the cartels' ability to run their businesses  
(Stratfor, 2008). 
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The relationship between the political, civilian, and military institutions are elucidated to 
attempt to find some correlation or possible causes for the extreme amount of organized 
crime violence throughout Mexico during the 21st century; and, Huntington’s Political 
Order in Changing Societies aided in conceptualizing as well as defining potential 
theories of the violent provenances.  
Violence Indicators and a Regression 
This thesis not only theorized about possible causes for the organized crime related 
violence, but also attempts to find correlations among different subnational dependent 
variables and organized crime violence as an independent variable.  A majority of the 
data collected is aggregated from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Georafía 
(INEGI), or National Institute of Statistics and Geography, but the organized crime 
homicide data are taken from TBI’s yearly reports, Drug Violence in Mexico, which have 
been repeatedly cited throughout this thesis.  The sample size of the regression will be all 
of the Mexican states, 31, and the Federal District, Mexico City.  Though, with this small 
sample size, the results will most likely not be significant, but the hypothesis proposed is 
that the regression could illuminate factors that are more or less important in determining 
the violence.  With the results from the regression and theoretical political science 
foundations, policy recommendations are framed in the Conclusion.  Again, the 
importance of geographical location, specifically whether or not a state borders the 
United States, is certain.  Thus, chapter V, entitled Two entidades federativas- Chihuahua 
and Yucátan, explicitly compares the most violent state, Chihuahua, with the least 
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violent, Yucátan.  Obviously, there are numerous determinants as to why the violence is 
more in Chihuahua than Yucátan, and they are juxtaposed in brief detail. 
 As asserted, Political Order in Changing Societies hypothesized that 
modernization is a key determinant to violence.  Not merely does the education and 
economic development of nation determine the levels of violence, but in fact, the 
modernization theory states that the processes of social mobilization, rationalization of 
authority, differentiation of new political functions, specialization of political structure, 
and participation in political affairs all contribute to violence within a country.  These 
processes are represented by various dependent variables within the erstwhile 
acknowledged regression.  The specific variables used in the regression are expounded 
upon in chapter IV.    
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II. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order and Mexican Violence 
No matter whether one has a positive or negative view of Huntington’s work, he was 
undeniably influential in the field of political science.  Huntington taught for over 50 
years at Harvard University (Harvard Gazette, 2008).   
Mentor to generations of scholars in widely divergent fields, he was the author or co-
author of a total of seventeen books, on American government, democratization, national 
security and strategic issues, political and economic development, cultural factors in 
world politics and American national identity (Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs, 2008).  
 
Some scholars considered Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) to be his most 
influential work (Putnam, 1986).  With liberal tendencies, “the onset of the Cold War and 
tensions of the McCarthy years had a profound impact on Huntington, confirming him in 
a more conservative appreciation for order and stability” (Putnam, 1986, p. 838).  In 
“Conservatism as an Ideology” (1957), Huntington explicated “The impulse to 
conservatism comes from the social challenge before the theorist, not the intellectual 
tradition behind him” (p. 470).  This article foreshadowed the importance put upon 
political institutions in his later work Political Order in Changing Societies (Putnam, 
1986).  First, this chapter focused on the main theses and arguments in Political Order 
(1968).  Next, a literary review offers critiques and praise of the book. Chapter III 
provides detailed explanations of how and why Political Order in Changing Societies 
(1986) is relevant to the current violence perpetuated by organized crime groups in 
Mexico. 
Political Order in Changing Societies 
Huntington explored for a rationale of why violence might not be merely a result of poor 
economic conditions, which he referred to as the poverty thesis. In his first chapter, 
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Political Order and Political Decay, Huntington outlined his theory of why some 
developing nations see a rise in violence or political decay while becoming more 
economically prosperous. He argued that the modernization thesis is a better way of 
understanding why violence or political instability might arise.  As the following 
quotation illustrates, political disorder arises from the process of modernization. 
The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and 
instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity 
but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to 
be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A 
purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable (Huntington, 1968, p. 41). 
 
The thesis followed the logic that if a developing nation is modernizing in economic 
terms and not evolving its political institutions, then a “political gap” arises; and, this 
attributes to the instability and violence within the country.  
In true academic fashion, Huntington theorized that the aspirations, expectations, 
political participations and social mobilizations of the people are affected by economic 
prosperity.  If the advancements of economics is not accompanied with parallel political 
improvement, the “political gap” arises, and the nation must attempt to produce political 
institutions that embodies “consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, 
effectiveness, [and stability” (Huntington, 1968, p. 1).  However, the large problem of 
how to properly measure abstract academic ideas such social aspiration or political 
effectiveness still exists over 30 years after Political Order (1968) was written.  In the 
succeeding section, a further discussion of the weaknesses of Huntington’s arguments is 
provided, but many of the critiques pertaining to Huntington remain relevant to political 
science and international relations. 
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 Political institutionalization is critical to community and political order 
(Huntington, 1968).  As stated in the introduction, Huntington defined the important 
terms social forces and political institutions to better develop his modernization thesis, 
and he admitted that distinctions between social forces and political institutions are 
unclear (p. 8-9). Status groups are an especially ambiguous term. Though, the “breakup 
of a small homogenous class, the diversification of social forces, and increased 
interaction among such forces are preconditions for the emergence of political 
organizations” (p.11). Wallerstein (1969) made this poignant remark in his review of 
Political Order,  
The secret, he feels, lies in the institutionalization of politics, the criteria of which he lays 
out quite explicitly in the opening chapter. And the key institution of modern politics is 
the political party (p. 440). 
 
 The strength of a political community relies on “the scope of support for the 
organization and procedures and their level of institutionalization” (p. 12).  While scope 
is the extent which the group “encompass[es] activity in the society”, 
“[i]nstitutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value 
and stability” (p. 12).  Huntington defined the level of institutionalization of a political 
system by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence (p. 12). He continued to 
title the subsequent subsections: Adaptability-Rigidity, Complexity-Simplicity, Autonomy-
Subordination, and Coherence-Disunity.  Moreover, “political institutions have moral as 
well as structural dimensions” (p. 24).  Public interests, morality, and trust are all to the 
success of a political institution, but the definition of these abstract ideas is difficult.   
Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways. It has been identified 
with either abstract, substantive, ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice or 
right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual (“L’état, c’est moi”), 
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group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among 
individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism) (p. 24). 
 
However, the same critique can be applied that public interest is a near impossible 
concept to calculate.  In other words, is it even possible for a complex society with more 
than one “social forces” to actually reach a general consensus?  Huntington argued, “A 
society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is more able 
to articulate and achieve its public interests” (p. 24). 
 On page 32, Huntington shifted from the importance of the people’s trust in 
government to the issues of political participation, modernization and political decay.  He 
described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of 
human thought and activity” (p. 32).  “The principal aspects of modernization, 
“‘Urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media 
participation do not occur in haphazard unrelated fashion’” (p. 32).   Lodge (1966), the 
quote within the previous quote, is one of the many scholars that Huntington utilizes 
throughout Political Order (1968) to reinforce his own theories.  Huntington qualified 
modernization as increasing literacy, mass communications, and education as well as 
“increas[ing] health and life expectancy, increase[ing] occupational, vertical, and 
geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of urban population as 
contrasted with rural” (p. 33).  The aforementioned quantifiable aspects of modernization 
were considered in more detail in the following chapters.   
 So, which aspects of modernization are most relevant to politics? Huntington 
listed two: social mobilization and economic government.  “Social mobilization, in 
Duetsch’s formulation, is the process by which “major clusters of old social, economic, 
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and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for 
new patterns of socialization and behavior”” (p. 33).  Economic development is simply 
“the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society” (p. 33).  He added 
crucial aspects to what specifies political modernization. Rationalization of authority, 
differentiation of new political functions with creation of specialized structures to 
perform the new functions, and escalation in political participation by social groups 
throughout society are the three broad headings of political participation (p. 44).  
 Next, Huntington explained the relationship between modernization, violence, 
and corruption which will be touched upon in more detail later in this chapter.  He 
concluded his first chapter, Political Order and Political Decay, with reiterating the 
importance of the “City-Country Gap” as well as providing urban-rural power and 
stability scenarios amongst different types of political and social regimes.  He adamantly 
stressed the importance of regarding the urban and rural populations separately until the 
country reaches modern stability, which he defined as the “countryside accept[ing] 
modern values and city rule” (p. 76).6 Moreover, he began explaining how political 
institutionalization and participation can differ in a civic versus praetorian regime.  A set 
of theories was reproduced from this first chapter to summarize how social mobilization 
and economic development can lead to political instability: 
(1) Social mobilization       
Economic development  = Social frustration 
(2) Social frustration  
Mobility opportunities   = Political Participation 
(3) Political participation 
Political institutionalization = Political instability (p. 55) 
                                                 
6
 For more on different phases and changes in urban-rural power/stability, please see the Appendix. 
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 For the purpose of this thesis, the first chapter from Political Order in Changing 
Societies was the most applicable.  This was where a bulk of the theory and explanation 
of the modernization theory occurred.  Nonetheless, the subsequent chapters were as 
follows: Political Modernization: America vs. Europe; Political Change in Traditional 
Societies; Praetorianism and Political Decay; Revolution and Political Order; Reform and 
Political Change; and Parties and Political Stability.  The chapter, Political 
Modernization: America vs. Europe, was not in the scope of this thesis.  The chapter, 
Political Change in Traditional Societies, focused on the following question: What 
political conditions, more specifically, what power conditions are conducive to policy 
innovation in modernizing societies? (p. 140). Huntington theorized that “evidence 
suggests that policy innovations are encouraged by a power distribution which is neither 
highly concentrated nor widely dispersed” (p. 140), and he continued to describe the 
possible policy innovations to promote group assimilation amongst different political 
systems and power configurations. 
 The next chapter, Praetorianism and Political Decay, mentioned the Mexico 
revolution.  The most useful information from this chapter described how Mexico 
evolved from praetorianism to civic order through the solider as the institution builder. 
Perhaps the most striking example of political institution building by generals is Mexico, 
where at the end of the 1920s Calles and the other military leaders of the Revolution 
created the National Revolutionary Party and in effect institutionalized the Revolution.  
The creation of this institution made it possible for the political system to assimilate a 
variety of new social forces, labor and agrarian, which rose to prominence under 
Cárdenas in the 1930s.  It also created a political institution which was able to maintain 
the integrity of the political sphere against disruptive social forces.  During the nineteenth 
century Mexico had the worst record of military interventions in politics of any Latin 
American country.  After the 1930s, its military stayed out of politics, and Mexico 
became one of the few Latin American countries possessing some form of institutional 
immunity to military coups d’état ( p. 255). 
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Next, the chapter, Revolution and Political Order, was discussed in further detail later in 
this chapter.  While revolution in modern Mexico seems to be an outlandish idea, the 
historical contexts of violence and revolution in Mexico are long-standing.   Finally, the 
last two chapters of Political Order in Changing Societies were not examined in this 
thesis. 
A Literary Review of Political Order in Changing Societies 
As mentioned, scholars debated on the merit and applicability of Political Order in 
Changing Societies (1968).  The first criticism that was more cosmetic than substantive 
was the flow of the book.  Wallerstein (1969) stated 
The main criticism to make is that Huntington has not written a book. Bound volumes of 
notes have been published so frequently of late that we scarcely notice anymore. To be 
sure, Huntington's notes are often argued with brilliance and panache, but the hard work 
of turning these notes into a coherent, carefully argued, integrated statement that seeks to 
account systematically for order and change in modern societies is yet to be done (p. 
441). 
 
 This was not the only criticism of Huntington’s work.  Hanifi (1969) argued that political 
stability was not the only important variable to be considered.  Moreover, Hanifi (1969) 
suggested that  
Huntington's thesis would have been more tenable had he cast political stability and 
political institutions, respectively, as the stabilizer and legitimatizer of change. It is un-
fortunate that the specialized subdisciplines of the social sciences, such as political 
science and economics, have held the unfounded primary assumption that in the limited 
sphere of their subject matter (about whose scope there is still disagreement within each 
of these subdisciplines) lies the key to understanding the sociocultural dimensions of 
man. 
 
There was a clear bias towards anthropology, and he questioned the worth of any 
contributions to “understanding the sociocultural dimensions of man” derived from 
political science and economics (Hanifi, 1969).   
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Sklar (1969) questioned whether declining classes and political decay were the 
true causes of violence.  Sklar (1969) explained  
Violence is the typical resort of declining rather than rising classes. It is also more likely 
to occur as the result of political repression rather than political decay. A rising class that 
encounters repression may attempt to overcome it by using violence against violence. 
Furthermore, the causes of decline and repression may be attributable, at least in part, to 
international relationships that are not examined in this book (571). 
 
This echoed the poverty thesis which Huntington tried to debunk or challenge with his 
modernization thesis.  Undoubtedly, the close relationship between violence and poverty 
needs further research and study.   A recent International Development Research Centre 
study examined the interactions between urbanization, poverty, and violence (Muggah, 
2012).   Thus, the debate over the causations of violence remains relevant in the 21st 
century, and there is no clear cut hypothesis or regression that will determine the 
causations of violence. Instead, policy makers must look at the problems of violence 
holistically. The poverty thesis can be seen as one of the largest critiques of Huntington’s 
Political Order in Changing Societies.  Lastly, Sklar (1969) disagreed that “the more man 
wages war against 'his ancient enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance,' the more he wages 
war against himself" (p. 572). 
 Kazemi (1969) had plenty of objections for Huntington: 
I find myself in disagreement with Huntington's view that social mobilization can be 
slowed down effectively and that this will help political stability. In the first place, forced 
slowdown of social mobilization can only be accomplished (and at that partially) by an 
oppressive political system… Secondly, forced slowdown of social mobilization is likely 
to lead to a great deal of discontent among those who are kept at their social, economic, 
and political positions by the government… Furthermore, there is hardly any discussion 
of other political institutions (such as bureaucracy) which could conceivably play a role 
as important as political parties… Measurement of institutionalization on the lines pro-
posed by Huntington presents additional difficulties (p. 177-78). 
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However, Kazemi (1969) conceded that “Many will disagree with Huntington's general 
analysis and his conclusions. But they will have to give him credit for clarifying some of 
the central issues of modernization.”  Kazemi (1969) presented one of the best overall 
critiques of Huntington’s work.  Oppression and bureaucracy were consistently missed in 
Huntington’s theory of modernization, and there was merit in many of Kazemi’s remarks. 
Again, the recurring argument against many scholarly works in political science, 
international relations, and economics was presented by Dennon (1970) “Too much of 
the book consists of very general observations on a very large subject. It is also too 
present-oriented, concerned with the strategies and tactics of actors currently on stage.”  
There were positive reviews as well, but the negative reviews revealed the problems with 
applying scholarly political science and economic theory to complex and innumerable 
variables that influence policy and reform. Obvious positive opinions exist, and Bayley 
(1969) was an excellent overview of how and why Political Order in Changing Societies 
contributes a great deal to the study of political science. 
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III. Political Order, Mexico, & Violence 
The following chapter compared the theses explained in Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968) with two critical time periods in Mexico. First, the Mexican Revolution 
of 1910 was briefly covered due to its important historical context as well as direct 
relationship to Huntington’s book.  Beginning on page 315, Huntington used the 1910 
Revolution as a paradigm of political development by revolution.  Second, a comparison 
between Huntington’s theories and 21st century Mexico, specifically 2007-2011, operated 
as an outline for a significant portion of the dependent variables, or violence indicators. 
Simply, this section applied Huntington’s theories to the Mexican case study. Keep in 
mind Huntington’s words.   “In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions 
are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the ‘public philosophy’” (p. 27). 
1910: Modern Politics is Born in Mexico 
First, the 1910 revolution example was used in Huntington’s chapter, Revolution and 
Political Order.  He explained the risks of modernization stemmed by revolution.  
Huntington produced different sources of revolution like the industrial labor, 
lumpenproletariat, and middle-class intelligentsia, but he cited Mexico as a successful 
case of political development by revolution.  The revolution, as Huntington argued, was 
brought on by “phenomenal economic development” (p. 315).  He explained, “The whole 
apparatus of a modern economy was dropped into place within a generation: railroads, 
banks, heavy industry, stable currency, and gild-edged national credit abroad” (p. 315-
16).  Moreover, this was accompanied by a growing gap between the rich and poor. 
Huntington (1968) also pointed to the fact that “by 1910 one per cent of the 
population owned 85 per cent of the arable land and 95 per cent of the ten million people 
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engaged in agriculture owned no land whatsoever” (p. 316).  He exposed the fact that the 
political system was unprepared to govern the impacts of modernization in conjunction 
with demands for more political expression.  The Mexican political system prior to the 
revolution was described as “one of uninstitutionalized personal and oligarchical rule, 
lacking autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability” (p. 316).  However, it was 
replaced by revolutionaries with  
a highly complex, autonomous, coherent, and flexible political system, with an existence 
of its own clearly apart from social forces and with a demonstrated capacity to combine 
the reasonably high centralization of power with the expansion of power and the 
broadened participation of social groups in the political system (p. 317). 
 
Moreover, a key reformation was the proceeding absence of the military in politics. 
Huntington gushed about the post-Revolution military. 
The subordination of previously autonomous social forces to the governing political 
institution was nowhere more dramatically revealed than in the changing role of the 
military in Mexican politics.  Before 1910 the politics of Mexico was both the politics of 
the military and the politics of violence (p. 319). 
 
Huntington mentioned the exceptionality of the 1910 revolution as a success case of the 
modernization thesis throughout the book, “albeit a revolution led by middle-class 
generals rather than middle-class intellectuals” (p. 255). 
Mexico, LAPOP, Modernization, and the Political Gap 
Now, Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), specifically his 
modernization thesis, were compared and contrasted with the current violence epidemic 
in Mexico.  When trying to dissect this complex topic, it can be helpful to think of 
violence, measured in drug homicides from 2007-2013, as the independent variable and 
the modernization thesis as the indicators or dependent variables. Huntington placed 
importance on the rise of expectations of people undergoing modernization. This rise in 
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expectations was usually paralleled by an increase in monetary wealth or general living 
standards. The political gap argument exists when this economic development is not 
accompanied with parallel political development. While Mexico’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita is an excellent indicator of economic expansion, political development 
is more difficult to quantify. Comparing violence to statistical variables is a useful 
analogy and exercise, but remember that violence posed by the cartels is a real and 
everyday problem to millions of Mexican citizens. 
Mexico’s brutal drug trafficking-related violence has been dramatically punctuated by 
more than 1,300 beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders, 
car bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists and government officials 
(Beittel, 2013). 
 
For a majority of Mexico’s modern history, political institutions have been consistently 
powerful (O’Neil et al., 2010). PRI established dominance over politics from 1917 
through 2000 (O’Neil et al., 2010).  However, beginning in the 1980s, PRI’s dominance 
began to erode as it faced economic challenges and accusations of large electoral fraud 
(O’Neil et al., 2010).  Two concurrent terms, 2000 and 2006, of Mexico’s presidency 
were representatives of PRI’s main opposition, the National Action Party (PAN) (O’Neil 
et al., 2010). So, the argument could be made that Mexican political institutionalization 
was waning throughout the 1980s culminating with the presidential elections of 2000, 
Vicente Fox, and 2006, Felipe Calderón. Plus, there was parallel economic development 
leading into 2007 (Figure 4), but further exploration of perceptions and actualities of 
Mexico’s political institutions is needed. 
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Figure 4: GDP over TIME 
 
Source: The World Bank 
Unfortunately, unbiased data collection on the Mexican people’s opinions is 
underdeveloped.  However, LAPOP has been collecting recent public opinion data 
biannually since 2004, and this coincides nicely with being a predictor of the escalation 
of violence, starting in 2007.  Since the first poll was taken in 2003, opinions and data on 
many local and midterm elections were collected.  “The political context” provided by 
LAPOP was as follows: 
These elections failed to motivate the electorate: abstention reached 58 percent, a high 
point in recent years. Compared with 10 years ago Mexico today is a more democratic 
country that enjoys a freer press and unbridled democratic competition even if this means 
that citizens are were less interested in voting in the 2003 midterm elections than they 
were 10 years ago when the participation rate reached 77 percent (Buendía et al., 2004, p. 
3). 
 
 This could be interpreted as public philosophy not being in accord with government 
actions. Additionally, the 2004 report described “Mexican politics at a crossroads”. 
The economic situation and the electoral results of 2003 demonstrate the frustration of 
Mexicans associated with the difference between expected and actual change. Simply 
put, President Vicente Fox raised expectations during his successful campaign for the 
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presidency and did not deliver promised results. Also, in early 2004 several corruption 
scandals that were given unprecedented coverage in the press increased discontent and 
disinterest with politics and politicians. Mexican politics is at a critical juncture and this 
makes the systematic evaluation of Mexican democracy is an important task (Buendía et 
al., 2004, p. 3). 
 
This would seem indicative that Huntington’s political gap theory may have merit as the 
intensification of violence occurred a mere three years later.   
Next, the 2006 LAPOP survey7 was significant not only because of the proximity 
to 2007, but also the number of major elections occurring throughout the survey period.  
The LAPOP 2006 survey in Mexico was done during the last month of the campaign to 
elect a president of the Republic, to renew both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 
as well as holding local elections for governorships and mayoralities in several states of 
the Republic (Parás et al., 2006, p. 8). 
 
As “the political context” continued, 2006 represented a further splintered political 
system.   
The 2006 political race, shows an equilibrium of forces unprecedented in the Mexico’s 
history, especially when considered at the level of states. Today, as never before, more 
states are governed by different parties. At a municipal level, a wide-ranging distribution 
of power is even more evident. Open political competition provides the citizenry with the 
opportunity to evaluate and compare the government programs of the different parties, 
and the electoral system allows them to judge, with their vote, whether it is wise for a 
given political party to repeat one additional period of governance, or whether a change 
would be wise (in Mexico, the reelection of specific presidents and governors is not 
permitted, nor is the immediate reelection of deputies, both local and federal, or mayors) 
(Parás et al., 2006, p. 8). 
 
Figure 5, showing the distribution of states governed by different political parties, 
followed the analysis. Again, the political gap hypothesis seemed to parallel 21st century 
Mexico, and the O’Neil et al. (2010) quote from the introduction is recalled, “Single-
party rule is very good for organized criminal groups”. 
                                                 
7
 2006 was the last Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico translated into English.  The 2008 and 2010 
reports are only available in Spanish. 
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 While increasing democratic tendencies is not the same as political 
institutionalization, the 2008 Cultura Política de la Democracia en Mexico (Cultura  
Figure 5: States Governed by Differing Political Parties, March 2006 
 
Source: Parás et al. (2006) 
Política) listed four central elements of democracy, adapted from Norris (1999), that may 
be affected by governance. 
1) Creencia en la democracia como el mejor sistema posible. Creencia en el concepto 
Churchilliano de democracia, a saber, que la democracia a pesar de todos sus 
problemas es mejor que cualquier otro sistema; 
2) Creencia en los valores esenciales de los que la democracia depende. Creencia en las 
dos dimensiones clave que definen la democracia según Robert Dahl (1971), derecho de 
oposición e inclusión.  
3) Creencia en la legitimidad de las instituciones clave de la democracia: el ejecutivo, el 
legislativo, el sistema de justicia y los partidos políticos.  
4) Creencia de que se puede confiar en otros. La confianza interpersonal es un 
componente clave del capital social. (Parás et al.,  2008, p. 15) 
 
These four elements outlined the core theses of the 2008 report entitled El impacto de la 
gobernabilidad or the impact of governance.  Again, the core focuses of the LAPOP 
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reports were the political culture of democracy, hence the title. So, this was not the exact 
same as Huntington’s political institutionalization, but since Mexico democratic, it served 
as a good proxy.  The contextual preface from the 2008 report was an excellent overview 
of Mexico’s public opinion as well as the driving questions behind the polls. 
México se enfrenta, como muchos otros países de América Latina, a la labor pendiente 
de su consolidación democrática. La transición votada, como se le denominó a la 
transición mexicana por vía de las urnas y que culminó con la elección presidencial de 
2006, ya quedó atrás. No obstante, el controvertido proceso electoral de ese año ha 
devuelto a las instituciones mexicanas, y en particular el Instituto Federal Electoral, la 
asignatura de organizar procesos  electorales limpios, equitativos, transparentes y, sobre 
todo, creíbles. En esta primera década del siglo XXI, que se perfila a concluir, México 
también se enfrenta a la necesidad de imponer el estado de derecho. La joven 
democracia mexicana, como otras democracias emergentes, da pasos hacia adelante 
pero camina flanqueada por el crimen organizado y por la corrupción. A su vez, México 
también se debate, a través de los más recientes cambios a la ley electoral, entre la 
ampliación y la restricción de las libertades y los derechos políticos de sus ciudadanos. 
Por si fuera poco, el país encara enormes retos en cuanto a la gobernabilidad y la 
concentración de poder en la hoy llamada partidocracia. Además, fuera de las cuestiones 
puramente políticas, la pobreza y la desigualdad continúan afligiendo a una sociedad 
que no ha terminado de regresar a los niveles que tenía hace 30 años. ¿Cuáles son los 
retos que, además de estos, se circunscriben a las actitudes y las percepciones de los 
ciudadanos? ¿Qué tan arraigada es la legitimidad democrática después del agrio 
episodio postelectoral de 2006? ¿Se registran avances en las actitudes democráticas de 
los mexicanos o, más bien, retrocesos? (Parás et al., 2008, p. 15) 
 
 The 2010 report is the most recent Política Cultura.8 The second chapter of the 
report focused on the perceptions and experiences of citizens during hard times in the 
Americas.  97.1 percent of Mexicans believed that there was a current economic crisis, 
and nearly 40 percent felt that either the past or then present government was culpable 
(Parás et al., 2011, p. 19 & 23).  Mexico also led Latin America in the highest percentage 
of homes that had at least one member lose a job in the past two years (Table 2). In 
addition, over a third of Mexicans saw a decrease in household income (Parás et al., 
2011, p. 31).  On average, Mexico had a negative change in perception of satisfaction  
                                                 
8
 The 2012 Política Cultura is listed as coming soon on the Vanderbilt-LAPOP website. 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico.php 
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Table 2: Homes with at least one member who lost their job in the last two years 
 
Source: LAPOP 2011 
 
with life (Parás et al., 2011, p. 37).  Figure 6 provides a list of possible determinants of 
the change in perception of satisfaction. Obviously, the economic crisis of 2008-09 had a 
large impact on daily life in Mexico.   
Returning to the idea of democracy as a proxy for political institutionalization, the 
2010 Política Cultura compiled a list of possible determinants of support for democracy 
Figure 7). Thus, in Mexico, economics most definitely affects people’s perceptions of 
politics. The end of the first part of the 2010 report touches upon support for a military 
coup, a subject out of the scope of this thesis; but, due to certain societal and cultural  
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Figure 6: Determinants in the change in perception of satisfaction with life in 
Mexico, 2010 
 
 
Figure 7: Determinants of support for Democracy in Mexico, 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP 2011 
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context, Latin American nations have a predisposition to military coups (Ames, 1987).9  
Mexico also has strong leanings towards the military, and most citizens support and trust 
the military, especially in regards to combatting organized crime violence (Camp, 2010).  
However, the amount of public support of a military coup in Latin America (Figure 8) 
would most likely worry most citizens in the “Global North”. Mexico recorded that 47.1 
percent believed that a military coup would be justified.  
 The second part of the 2010 Política Cultura dealt with the controversial issues of  
Figure 8: Justification of a military coup in the Americas 2008 vs. 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP (2011) 
                                                 
9
 Ames (1987) estimated that 51 military coups occurred from 1945 to 1982.  For more information on 
Mexican armed forces and combatting organized crime, please see Camp (2010). 
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rule of law, crime, delinquency, corruption, and civil society.  The basic responsibility of 
a government is to keep its citizens safe, and in 2010, 43.5 percent of Mexicans felt that 
they were unsafe (Parás et al., 2011, p. 72).  Nearly 40 percent of Mexican households 
had been the victim of a crime with over half of those crimes occurring on the local level 
(Parás et al., 2011, p. 75-6). Being ineffective on the local level, especially when dealing 
with crime, is a reoccurring problem of the Mexican government.  Just this past week, 
April 24, Governor Angel Aguirre Rivero signed a pact to legalize vigilantes, or local 
self-defense forces (Bargent, 2013).  Furthermore, organized crime groups are expanding 
into different municipalities.  Figure 9, showing the growth of different cartels over time, 
is reproduced from a news article explaining why the ruthless Zetas expanded faster than 
their rivals (Dudley & Rios, 2013). 
Figure 9: Number of municipalities in which criminal organizations operate, 1991-
2010 
  
Source: Coscia & Rios (2012) 
 What becomes apparent is that Mexico’s political institutions, especially on the 
local level, are riddled with corruption and crime.  The 2010 Política Cultura stated that 
76.3 percent of Mexicans view their country as corrupt, and 35 percent, second of 
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LAPOP countries, reported that they had been victimized by corruption (Figure 10) 
(Parás et al., 2011, p. 85).  
Figure 10: Victimized by corruption in comparative perspective 
 
In addition, 39 percent of Mexicans acted outside the rule of law, and only 56.8 percent 
of Mexicans support the political system (Parás et al., 2011, p. 92 & 101). Figure 11 
shows the confidence of Mexicans (2010) different institutions. The Army and the 
Catholic Church rank the highest with 72.2 and 70.4 percent respectively.  The national 
police and political parties rank the lowest with 36.4 and 35.4 percent confidence.  
Figure 12 shows Mexican confidence in institutions over time. Both of these figures give 
insight to political institutionalization in Mexico. Moreover, only 44.6 percent, third 
lowest of LAPOP countries, are satisfied with democracy.  These numbers seem to 
support the idea that a political gap exists in Mexico.  
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Figure 11: Confidence in institutions in Mexico, 2010 
 
Figure 12: Confidence in instiutions in Mexico, 2004 through 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP (2011) 
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The last chapter of the 2010 Política Cultura discussed in this section focused on 
civil society and citizen participation. Interpersonal confidence among Mexicans have 
stayed relatively constant from 2004 to 2010 (Parás et al., 2011, p. 122), but it was the 
distribution of confidence among different levels of education that stood out among 
LAPOP’s analysis.  Figure 13 shows confidence levels spread across three different 
indicators: perception of insecurity, level of education, and age.  Most interpersonal  
Figure 13: Mexican interpersonal confidences over perception of insecurity, level of 
education and age, 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP (2011) 
relations or participation was a religious meeting, and Participación en reuniones de una 
comité o junta de mejoras fell from 16.9 to 13 percent, a relative 23 percent decrease, 
over the LAPOP survey years (Figure 14).  However, from 2008 to 2010, interest in 
politics rose from 35.2 to 28.6 percent (Parás et al., 2011, p. 135). Again, there can be 
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arguments for and against Huntingon’s theses, but it is necessary to not only look at 
Mexico on the national level, but also the subnational. 
Figure 14: Mexican participation in civil organizations, meetings, 2004 through 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP (2011) 
 
Ejecuciones, Institutionalization, and Other Indicators: A subnational focus 
While the LAPOP surveys are critical to further academic research on Mexican policy, 
this thesis approached the issue of organized crime violence on the subnational level. 
Truly in depth political science and economic analysis covering organized crime violence 
in Mexico requires a subnational focus. While specific Mexican subnational data on 
organized crime violence and corresponding indicators are difficult to collect, this thesis 
attempted to develop a valid regression analysis of these variables.   Chapters IV 
provided more in depth examination of these regressions.  This section aimed to identify 
possible subnational indicators in correspondence with the previously developed 
Huntington theses.   
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 The 2010 Política Cultura reported that only 9.4 percent of Mexicans, compared 
with 24.9 percent of US citizens, participated in local government meetings (Parás et al., 
2011, p. 141).  However, this participation has decreased in Mexico from 12.8 percent, in 
2004, to 9.4 percent in 2010 (Parás et al., 2011, p. 142). Figure 15 shows how support of 
the political system across different indicators, and it is the last figure reproduced from 
the Política Cultura reports. Again, while LAPOP provides invaluable data on the  
Figure 15: Support of the political system across size of localities, support for 
democracy, satisfaction with the current president, political interest, and 
satisfaction with local government services 
 
Source: LAPOP (2011) 
 
national level, further data on the subnational level still needs to addressed and examined. 
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 The Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Georafía (INEGI), the national statistics 
institute, provides the most reliable statistics on the Mexican subnational level. Thus, 
academics and policy makers alike are primarily restricted to the data provided by the 
INEGI.  The only other source of subnational data used in this thesis is the Trans-Border 
Institute. TBI has collected and aggregated homicides that could be attributable to 
organized crime violence.  Their sources were mainly Mexican periodicals and self-
reporting.  As mentioned in the introduction, there is still debate on the exact number of 
homicides attributable to organized crime or ejecuciones.  
 Due to the ambiguous nature surrounding Huntington’s theses, finding specific 
variables that paralleled concepts such as modernization, institutionalization, and the 
political gap was not a perfect science. Recall that social forces, consensus, community, 
effectiveness, adaptability, complexity, and expectations all contribute to defining 
Huntington’s main theses. Thus, the data provided by TBI and INEGI acted as proxy 
variables for violence and its complementary explanatory variables.  Some of the 
variables, which will be reviewed in chapters IV and V, included GDP, post offices, total 
schools, medical personnel, unemployment, labor disputes, and jail capacities. Moreover, 
some dummy variables were included to account for rural v. urban populations and US-
Mexico border v. non-border states. Additional analyses of appropriate indicator 
variables were provided in the subsequent chapters. 
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IV. Violence Predictors and Regression Analysis 
Huntinton described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all 
areas of human thought and activity” (1968, p. 32). Clearly, not every process of human 
thought and activity can be replicated in an econometric model, but this thesis attempted 
to choose appropriate variables that corresponds to Huntingon’s main theses.  
Appropriately, this Mexico case study focused on the subnational level. As mentioned, 
Mexican subnational data is somewhat limited.  For instance, subnational population 
figures were compiled from the Consejo Nacional de Población and INEGI.  Then, 2007 
and 2008 population data were generated through Stata manipulation. In fact, through 
careful analysis of INEGI data, it was possible to find pivotal time periods in Mexican 
data collection. In 1994 and 2005, there were obvious increases in data availability. It is 
possible that the INEGI delays or simply does not publicize all the data collected by their 
institution, but this thesis only utilizes information readily available to the public.  
In order to find significant violence indicators, the following regressions used 
panel data over time. The dependent variables were lagged by a year so that they could 
act as predictors of violence. While this thesis primarily refers to dependent variables as 
indicators, the proper interpretation of the following regressions is actually predictors of 
violence.10  This decision was made due to the lack of data before 2005 and after 2009, 
from the INEGI, but it is useful to policy development either way. Consequently, there 
were two time series.  The first time period, relating to the dependent variables, spanned 
                                                 
10
 Certainly, a semantic argument could be made that indicators are not the same as predictors.  However, 
the lack of data on Mexican ejeucciones restricts the time period that can be used in regression analysis. In 
order for the regression to include five years of data, this adjustment was necessary. 
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from 2005 to 2009. The second time period, relating to the independent variable, covered 
from 2006 to 2010. 
Defining the violence predictor variables 
First, the dummy variables were defined. As previously stated, geographic distribution of 
the cartels’ power and influence corresponds with ejeucciones.  Thus, dummy variables 
were generated to test this hypothesis. The dummy variable created to account for this 
geographic distribution was border versus non-border states. Baja California, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas were given a value of 1 with all other states given 
a 0 value. Huntington argued that urbanization also attributed to violence. Cities tend to 
be the wealthiest locations both in terms of economic monetization and political 
diversity, and these both contribute to modernization. In order to test this hypothesis, 
entidades federativas with an urban area surpassing 500 square kilometers were given a 
value of 1 with all other states given a 0 value. Figure 16 compares different Mexican 
states by total surface area and urban surface area. As Figure 16 depicts, 11 states met 
the 500 square kilometer threshold.  
Next, variables were chosen through a process of elimination based on the sample 
size restrictions.  The sample size consisted of all the Mexican states and the Federal 
District, 32 groups in total, over 5 years, 2006 to 2010.  So, the total number of 
observations was 160. The important violence predictors obtained through this process 
were as follows: GDP per capita, farm aid provided through PROCAMPO, number of 
electricity users, number of airports, number of post offices, number of public buses in  
circulation, number of commercial banks, municipality expenditures, general deaths, total 
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Figure 16: Mexican states urban surface area versus total surface area, in square 
kilometers 
 
Source: INEGI 
number of schools, number of medical personnel, consultations per doctor, non-active 
members in the economy, working age population, unemployment rate, labor disputes, 
labor solutions, murders offenses recorded by the courts, number of public libraries, and 
jail capacities. 
A problem occurred when trying to regress these dependent variables against 
ejeucciones. Population size was not taken into account, and in order to compare these 
variables on the same scale, the values needed to be normalized. So, state populations 
were generated through the process mentioned above. 2005 figures were provided by 
INEGI.  2006 and 2009 figures were provided by the Consejo Nacional de Población. 
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2007 and 2008 figures were extrapolated through Stata by dividing GDP by GDP per 
capita, both of which contained complete data sets. Besides state population and 
ejeucciones, all other data sets were supplied by INEGI. All of the variables, independent 
and dependent, included in the following regressions were normalized by state 
population. 
Regressions 
To begin, GDP per capita seemed to be the most comprehensive proxy variable for 
Huntington’s modernization thesis. The argument was an increase in wealth would 
correspond with more modernization, and this would lead to more violence. The basic 
panel regression equation is as follows: 
yit = α + β’X it + uit 
In this first regression, the β was simply GDP per capita; α was a Stata generated 
constant; uit was the error term or what remains unexplained by the independent variable; 
and, yit was ejeucciones per capita. For simplicity, the fixed effects model is used for all 
of the regressions in this thesis. After running the xtreg command in Stata, surprisingly, 
GDP per capita was insignificant in predicting organized crime homicides per capita. 
This could have been due to other variables, or causal factors, that were not accounted for 
or simply omitted variable bias.   
Following this first regression, all of the previously listed dependent variables 
were tested for significance solely against organized crime related homicides.  Obviously, 
omitted variable bias was a consistent problem throughout these regressions, but by 
determining which variables were significant on their own, the exercise allowed for 
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further regressions to be developed.  The following variables, all normalized by 
population, were found to be significant, at the 95 percent confidence level, with 
corresponding t statistics in parentheses: number of electricity users (3.05), number of 
post offices (-3.65), number of commercial banks (4.44), municipality expenditures 
(4.35), general deaths (8.50), total number of schools (3.04), number of medical 
personnel (2.71), unemployment rate (5.28), labor disputes (4.32), labor solutions (2.21), 
and murder offenses recorded by the courts (7.85). While some of the results were 
unexpected, some of the variables correlate directly with ejeucciones per capita. So, 
significance was probable. For instance, general deaths and murder offenses recorded by 
the courts should intuitively appear to correlate with ejeucciones. Respectively, general 
deaths and murder offenses correlated with the independent variable by 32.11 and 64.31 
percent. The only significant variables with under 10 percent, positive or negative, 
correlation with ejeucciones were number of post offices (-9.55%), municipality 
expenditures (5.41%), total number of schools (3.99%), and number of medical personnel 
(0.54%).  
 Next, the four previous significant dependent variables were tested for 
multicollineraity.  Unfortunately, total schools and post offices were highly correlated, 
57.25%, and medical personnel was highly correlated with the other three. Nonetheless, 
post offices, municipality expenditures, schools, and medical personnel were regressed 
against organized crime violence.  Only post offices (-1.99) and municipality expenditure 
(1.98) remained constant.  If they were interpreted as being a significant dependent 
variable, even with the multicollinearity problems, One additional dollar expended on 
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municipalities per capita would increase ejeuccion per capita by .0000393, and one 
additional post office per capita would decrease the ejeuccion per capita by a large .173. 
This large value leads one to speculate whether certain outliers were at play, but 
organized crime violence is by no means linear.  So, post offices, which are relatively 
constant, may have been over estimated by Stata. 
 Numerous regressions can be formulated, but the first stated significant dependent 
variables consistently prevail as the only significant variables when running fixed effect 
regressions.  Moreover, a R squared value did not breach 20 percent meaning that less 
than that was actually explained by the dependent variables. The only possible way to 
breach that mark was to add general deaths or court murder cases, and there were obvious 
problems with using those variables.  While both the border and urban variables were 
found to be significant, each would have increased organized crime homicides per capita 
by less than .0000. Lastly, as they were removed due to collinearity, the dummy variables 
were run against ejeucciones in a random effects model. Thus, in this instance, it seems 
that econometrics and regression analysis, while useful, were not able to significantly 
further the discussion pertaining to Mexican organized crime violence. 
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V. Two entidades federativas- Chihuahua and Yucátan 
With over 22,000 organized crime homicides occurring in Chihuahua, it was by far the 
most violent state in Mexico from 2006 to 2012. In comparison, Yucátan only tallied 35 
ejecuciones (TBI, 2013). The question remained unsolved after the regression analysis, 
and whether it was due to sporadic data or seemingly unpredictable violence, there are 
clear limitations to what econometrics can provide. In many regards, Chihuahua and 
Yucátan are complete opposites. Sitting on the border of the United States, Chihuahua is 
over 1,000 miles from Yucátan, which is approximately 250 miles from the Belize 
border. Again, the juxtaposition is stark when comparing the sizes of the two entidades 
federativas. Chihuahua, Mexico’s largest state, is over 95,000 square miles, and Yucátan 
is less than a sixth of the size, 15,294 square miles (INEGI, 2005). 
Border versus Non-Border States 
While there are many differences between Chihuahua and Yucátan, the variable that 
seems most significant is the location.  Simply, US-Mexico border states are integral to 
not only the trafficking of illegal goods and services, but also legal trade between Mexico 
and the US. Moreover, while Huntington’s theses suggest that economic prosperity is 
somehow positively correlated with violence, in GDP per capita, Chihuahua only 
surpassed Yucátan by 21,000 pesos or 1,700 USD (INEGI, 2008), and the variation of 
GDP annual percentage was nearly identical for the two states (Figure 17) (INEGI). If 
the economic theory behind the modernization thesis was incompatible with Chihuahua 
and Yucátan, possibly urbanization was significant factor in the amount of violence. 
However, when normalized for size, urban area was actually a larger percentage of 
Yucátan than Chihuahua.  
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Figure 17: GDP annual percentage change, Chihuahua and Yucátan, 2003-2008 
 
Source: INEGI 
 Another difference between the two states is their respective populations. 
Chihuahua has nearly 1.5 million more people than Yucátan (INEGI. 2010). It was 
surprising to find that, historically, Yucátan had more illiterate citizens, and only recently 
has Chihuahua surpassed Yucátan in this category (Figure 18). So far, this was the only 
piece of evidence supporting Huntington’s theses. He argued that less educated people 
would have lesser expectations and less modernization. However, further exploration 
would show that Chihuahua citizens had over double the amount of households with 
computers, but basic infrastructure, such as running water and electricity were even 
among the entidades federativas. So, no clear distinction could be made whether 
Huntington’s theses were valid. 
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Figure 18: Number of illiterate citizens, Chihuahua and Yucátan, 1994-2008 
 
Source: INEGI 
 The conclusion that can be drawn from this two state analysis was more 
consistent and reliable data needs to be taken in Mexico on a yearly basis. While it would 
be a hindrance to the public, hopefully, the Mexican government has the data, but 
chooses not to publicize it. At least, the men and women in charge of reform and policy 
would have access to crucial information. Variables, such as computers per household, 
population, and even public libraries, are either not recorded each year or riddled with no 
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disponible. Without complete data sets, political science and economic analyses become 
much more time intensive and speculative. 
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VI. Conclusion 
While many topics and issues surrounding Mexico’s institutions were out of the scope of 
this thesis, a few notes on policy and reform are required. First, it is imperative that the 
United States and Mexico work together. It is the opinion of this author that cartels, 
organized crime groups, drug-trafficking organizations, or whatever will become the new 
term describing Mexican crime syndicates are the largest national security threat to the 
US. Mexican cartels operate in every major US city, and every day, Americans use illegal 
drugs smuggled from Mexico.  Additionally, the seriousness of the threat posed by OCGs 
in Mexico should not be taken lightly.  
According to the Mexico‘s National Council Against Addiction (CONADIC), the use of 
marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine in Mexico increased steadily from 2002 to 
2008. Northern states are disproportionately impacted by the increased availability of 
drugs resulting from failed smuggling attempts and TCOs' use of drugs as payments (U.S. 
Department of State, 2012).  
The symbiotic relationship of drugs for guns between Mexico and the United States 
needs to stop immediately, or more bloodshed will follow.  
 As stated repeatedly throughout this thesis, more transparent and consistent data 
needs to be collected on the subnational level in Mexico. Without it, policy will continue 
to be determined in back rooms, and Mexican citizens will continue to distrust their 
government. The only way out is legitimate rule of law and education. While politicians, 
technocrats, and bureaucrats all have their individual calling, this author believes that 
Mexico will prosper through education, but the only way to do so effectively is for rule of 
law to be respected and wanted. This is being shown by the current vigilantes springing 
up across the country, and if the government does not heed these ominous warnings, it 
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could find itself in direct opposition with the public philosophy. Currently, President 
Nieto is attempting to reform these very two problems, but once again, only education 
and rule of law will bring peace to los ciudadanos mexicanos. 
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Figure 8: Mexico’s degree of economic openness and international competitiveness 
 
Source: Rodriguez (2009) 
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Evaluations of Traditional Criminal Justice System 
Do you agree with this statement: The traditional criminal justice system was effective 
and/ or efficient. 
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Evaluations of the 2008 Reforms to Mexican Criminal Procedure 
What is your general opinion of the 2008 criminal procedure reform? [CIII.1] 
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Expectations Regarding Effect of New System on Criminality 
Do you agree with this statement: The new criminal justice system will help reduce 
criminality [CIII.8] 
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